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Philosophy of Information is an active contemporary branch of philosophy, 
dealing with problems in the analysis of the concept of information, in semantics, in the 
study of intelligence, in the relation between information and nature, and in the 
investigation of values[1]. There are many contributions about the ontological nature of 
information, the definition of data and the philosophical approaches to semantic 
information; one important publication is the review presentation of Floridi in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy[2], where amongst others he introduces an extension of 
Mathematical theory of Communication (Sannon’s information theory[3]) in the area of 
semantics.  
One of the open problems in philosophy of information presented by Floridi is 
the problem of localization, whether information could be naturalized[4]. The 
externalists / extensionalists (for example, Barwise[5] or Dretske[6]) have the difficult 
duty to present how information resides in the world independently of the informee 
and the sense under which an external object constitutes information. The internalists / 
intentionalists (for example, Fodor[7],[8] or Searle[9]) have the opposite duty to explain 
how the interaction between information and informee is exclusively an internal 
cognitive operation, where the value of the external stimuli is negligible. We should 
also mention here the nonmaterial objectivism, where the entities exist in an area 
perceived only by human mind but not human senses. This is the philosophical position 
emerging from Platonism, which continues to be today active usually in 
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mathematicians’ and physicists’ views, where the ‘platonic’ patterns are mathematical 
truths or universal physical laws. Lastly, another branch of philosophers 
(constructivists) suggest that information is constructed during the learning process, 
where both the individual and his environment participate. 
Harnad has dealt extensively with the symbol grounding problem, posing the 
question “How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made 
intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? How 
can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated only on the basis of 
their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other meaningless symbols?”[10] 
He suggests a hybrid non-symbolic / symbolic system, a "dedicated" one, in which the 
elementary symbols are grounded in two kinds of non-symbolic representations[11]. It 
is a bottom-up scheme of three representation levels: (1) non-symbolic iconic 
representations, that is the sensory data, (2) non-symbolic categorical representations, 
that is the concepts constructed within the human mind through abstraction of 
individual sensory data, which become the elementary symbols and (3) symbolic 
representations, that is syntactical combinations of the elementary symbols. These levels 
also indicate the ground-up route from sense data to symbols, answering how the 
meaningless higher order symbols borrow meaning from the elementary categorical 
symbols on which they are grounded[12]. 
Following the hybrid dedicated symbol system of Harnad, information is not 
internal in the strict sense (parasitic in the mind of the informee), but semi-internal, 
grounded on semi-internal iconic representations (where both observer and observant 
take part) and internal categorical representations produced by human conscience.  
Trying to reduce the scope of the current investigation, focusing on digitally 
viewed information, I select as working hypothesis, the “it from bit” theory[13], where 
information is considered as the ultimate constituent of the universe and the natural 
processes, including causation, are seen as special cases of information dynamics[14]. 
Based on this hypothesis, I will try to present a more radical view; that information is 
placed neither in the external material world nor within us; instead, it exists in digital 
form, as the constituent of a platonic type nonmaterial world. 
In the Platonic allegory of the two worlds[15], the material world we perceive 
through our senses, represented in Republic as a cave, is only a delusion; it is just a copy 
or reflection of another world, which consists of ideas. The world of ideas is the true 
world, which is accessible not by the senses, but by the mind. I introduce here an 
informative version of the Platonic allegory, which I call Information Platonic Model. In 
this model, information, in the form of innumerable combinations of two distinct states 
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(bits 0 and 1), constitutes the true world, whereas material objects are reflections of 
these information entities. Therefore, the true world consists ultimately of bits and what 
we sense is only a transformed image adapted to our perceptual mechanism. 
The above concern information as the background substance of anything. What 
about the nature of the human-driven electronic information, the instruction codes 
produced by human beings and the digitized data?  
Writing an instruction code, according to a set of rules, could be considered as 
the conclusion of a long evolutionary course. The natural environment itself avails 
matter; through the evolution process various material forms proved to be successful in 
the context of microcosms within the universe; a kind of them, human beings, 
manifested the extraordinary capability of abstraction; based on it, after a lot of 
discoveries and inventions, they designed and implemented mathematics, computer 
arithmetic, and computer languages eventually used in computer programming. 
According to the Information Platonic Model, matter is a phenomenon grounded on 
binary information; the whole universe reduces to information; all material forms, 
including human beings are reflections of binary entities. Under this perspective, 
human beings are both expressions of digital material and producers of digital material, in 
the form of instruction codes (software modules); these codes manipulate another form 
of digital material – data - giving results, with a large impact on both human beings and 
their environment.  
How these two kinds of produced digital material - instruction codes and data - 
are related to the ultimate background digital material? Are they human-driven entities or 
independent ‘residents’ of another world, which are simply met and revealed by human 
beings? We design and implement certain instruction codes in order to attain specific 
results. We also sample and digitize texts, numbers, sounds, speech, music, photos, 
pictures, videos, etc. In the context of the Information Platonic Model, where every 
natural or artificial appearance can be ultimately reduced to combinations of 0 and 1, 
there is no ground for observers or points of reference. Consequently, both computer 
software and computer data, though they are human products, are neither objective, 
nor subjective, neither random nor aimed. They are images of real and existing binary 
entities of the true informative world, with not distinguishable nature from the other 
material objects, including their ‘creators’. In this context, binary coded instructions and 
data are not invented; they just manifest themselves from an upper level, where all 
possible combinations of 0 and 1 of any length reside. Digital material under the cover 
of human form meets again itself in the form of instruction codes and digitized data, as 
the mythical snake that eats its tail. 
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Another interesting element of any structure is the relations involved. What is 
the nature of these relations expressed in the form of links? What is their role in the 
Information Platonic Model frame? I think that they can also be considered as 
reflections of real connections between real entities, revealing the dynamic ever-floating 
structure of the true world of binary information. 
2. A review of ancient classification schemata in respect to modern relationship types 
Conceptual representations are extracted in human mind from the perceptual 
data through the operations of discrimination and identification. We group a set of 
similar observations, out of the total available observations, based on a number of certain 
characteristics common in all the elements of the set. Then we give a label to the set to 
be used as representative of any of the included observations. We create in this way a 
number of abstract noetic entities – concepts - organized in a hierarchical structure of 
classes. Each of the classes both belongs to a higher class, called parent class, and 
includes a number of lower classes, called descendant classes, except the highest one, 
which has no parent and the lowest ones, which have no descendants. The lower the 
class, the larger its depth and the smaller its width. Each class takes the role of gender in 
respect to its descendant classes and species in respect to its parent class.  
The taxonomy of concepts in genera and species originates from Aristotle, the 
philosopher who first systematized (1) the relations between concepts, (2) the structure 
of propositions and (3) the types of admissible and non-admissible syllogisms in 
Categories, Topics, Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics. He considers individuals as a 
distinct category of substances, calling them in Categories[16] primary substances, which 
cannot be predicated of any subject. On the other hand all genera, called secondary 
substances, can be predicated of relative individuals or descendant genera. For example 
John is a man, man is an animal, John is an animal.  
Aristotle continued the work of Plato, who was the first who spoke about the 
noetic entities under the name of ideas (εἴδη or ἰδέαι) and introduced dialectics, the 
practice of the division of concepts in successive classes in his earlier works Meno, 
Republic and Phaedrus, and systematically in his later works Parmenides and Sophist. 
In Meno, Plato introduces the term dialectical in the phrase “The more dialectical 
way, I suppose, is not merely to answer what is true, but also to make use of those 
points which the questioned person acknowledges he knows.”[17] 
In Republic, he adds “we have set dialectics above all other studies to be as it were 
the coping stone and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above 
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it”[18], and he gives the definition of dialectician as “the man who is able to exact an 
account of the essence of each thing”.[19] 
The human capability of abstraction is presented perspicuously in Phaedrus: “a 
human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by 
means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those 
things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above 
the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that 
the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in 
communion through memory with those things.”[20]  
Plato not only presents here the process of abstraction but he also declares 
explicitly his position, in words of Socrates, that the concepts are not human creatures; 
they exist independently of man in another world, and they can be recollected by man 
through the operation of memory. With this phrase he opens a tremendous 
philosophical subject, which has not ceased to be an object of study and conversation 
until now, declaring that ideas exist independently in another level beyond material 
world. The allegory of the cave in Republic[21] complements the above statement, 
through the characterization of the material world as a mirror world of shadows. I will 
refer to this classical Platonic position of absolute independent ideas as Phaedrus-
Platonic, so that it can be distinguished from late Platonic positions in Parmenides and 
Sophist that face critically that early position. 
Later, in Phaedrus, he describes the practice of “perceiving and bringing together 
in one idea the scattered particulars”[22], and he presents the opposite human 
capability “of dividing things by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to 
break any part, after the manner of a bad carver”[23]. His remark ‘where the natural 
joints are’ is very interesting, since he stresses there that the art of division into classes is 
a demanding task, taking into account the critical differences among the various 
differences between the objects to be classified. Plato’s more detailed presentation of 
classification structure takes place in Sophist, where he gives a detailed example of 
defining the practice of sophists through successive division of concepts in further 
narrower classes, in the form of a reversed tree[24]. I will refer to this Platonic model of 
successive classes as Sophist-Platonic. This classification schema was adopted and 
systemized later by Aristotle. 
The correspondence between material objects and noetic entities was and still 
remains a very demanding philosophical task. Aristotle tried to reduce the gap between 
ideas and objects, considering that each individual (primary substance) possesses both 
form (εἶδος) and matter[25]. I present next the attacks to the Phaedrus-Platonic position 
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of absolute ideas both in Parmenides, within the words of Parmenides, and in Sophist 
within the words of the stranger, which perhaps echo the beliefs of Plato himself in his 
late philosophical considerations. 
In Parmenides, young Socrates takes part in a very interesting dialogue with 
Parmenides[26], the founder of Eleatic philosophy. Parmenides makes Socrates defend 
his opinion about ideas. This task proves to be very difficult. The term used to denote 
the relation between sensible things and distinct ideas is ‘participating’, (Greek terms: 
μεταλαμβάνειν, μετέχειν). Parmenides takes the hypothesis of things’ participating to 
ideas and leads it to the contradiction that anything participates to both the idea of 
likeness and unlikeness[27]. Next Parmenides asks explicitly Socrates if he is the man 
who invented the theory of the abstract ideas distinct from the things that participate to 
them. And he complements the question, asking him if he considers abstract likeness 
apart from the likeness we possess[28]. By the positive answer of Socrates, Plato 
presents him explicitly as the introducer of the fundamental philosophical position, 
which I called before as Phaedrus-Platonic position. Parmenides does in this point his 
direct attack to this theory, asking Socrates whether there exists an abstract idea of man 
apart from each individual person, a distinct idea of fire or a distinct idea of water. 
Socrates declares that he cannot answer[29]. Then, Parmenides encouraged extends his 
critique against distinct ideas, asking Socrates whether there exist ideas of ridiculous 
things, like hair, mud, dirt, or anything else vile and worthless. Socrates answers 
negatively, saying that he prefers to deal with the important ideas he is sure to exist[30]. 
This debate reveals the nonsense brought out through the careless extension of a 
reasonable position. Next, Parmenides uses the trick of the division of an idea into 
parts, to show that participating to the ideas of smallness, equality or greatness either to 
the whole or to a part of them lead to contradictions[31]. Then Socrates tries to escape 
by supporting the possibility that each of these ideas of quantity “may be only a 
thought, which can exist only in our minds”[32]. This is a very interesting reference that 
shows that the modern opinion that ideas are but human concepts, residing only in 
human minds, was not excluded, concerning some ideas, even by Socrates (either 
Socrates himself or Platonic Socrates), the introducer of the model of distinct ideas. But, 
later Socrates returns to add an important characteristic of the ideas, their operation as 
patterns (Greek word παραδείγματα): “ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other 
things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas is 
assimilation to them, that and nothing else.[33]” The ideas as patterns and the 
participation as a course of assimilation are important components of the traditional 
Phaedrus-Platonic position. Neither this position remains invulnerable, as Parmenides 
shows that such a position leads to an infinite series of ideas related to a certain 
thing[34]. Later Parmenides addressing to Socrates, says: “I think that you or anyone 
else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place 
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that none of them exists in us”[35], where Socrates agrees with this thesis. It is the most 
perspicuous declaration of Phaedrus -Platonic position that the ideas are absolute and 
they do not exist in us. This position is then seriously attacked by Parmenides, who 
shows that this opinion leads to the incapability of human beings to know the ideas[36].  
Sophist is another late Platonic dialogue, where the propositions of the called 
“friends of ideas”[37] are proved to be insufficient. The stranger here, playing perhaps 
the role of Plato himself, shows that it is quite unreasonable to consider ideas as 
absolute still entities, since the truly ‘being’ is characterized by movement and life[38]. 
In conclusion the stranger proves the Phaedrus-Platonic position clearly insufficient, 
introducing a synthetic opinion, bridging the Eleatic school of invariable substance with 
the Ionian school of dynamic change. 
Later, Aristotle continues the critique against the ontological separability of the 
ideas in respect to the objects, saying “But while they involve difficulty in many 
respects, not the least absurdity is the doctrine that there are certain entities apart from 
those in the sensible universe, and that these are the same as sensible things except in 
that the former are eternal and the latter perishable. For [Platonists] say nothing more or 
less than that there is an absolute Man, and Horse, and Health; in which they closely 
resemble those who state that there are Gods, but of human form; for as the latter 
invented nothing more or less than eternal men, so the former simply make the Forms 
eternal sensibles.”[39].  
In spite of the difficulties of philosophical grounding of Phaedrus-Platonic 
position, both late Plato in Sophist, and Aristotle in his works concerning logic, adopt 
the model of successive classes (Sophist-Platonic model), at least as a tool, due to the 
efficiency of the taxonomic organization in hierarchical classes of concepts, in various 
theoretical considerations. The relationship covering all the extension of this scheme is 
the BT/NT (broader term / narrower term) relationship, where a term-concept is included 
in the depth of another term-concept. For example every eagle is a bird, but a bird is not 
necessarily eagle. 
Additionally, we can identify the objects of our environment through the class-
concept it belongs to, saying that a certain person is a human being, a certain dog is a 
dog, a certain flower is a flower of a specific category, a certain table is a table, a certain 
car is a car of a specific brand. This is the instance_of relationship developed by Aristotle 
in the various types of syllogism. It means that a real object is an instance of the general 
concept.  
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Walking a step further we can make thesauri, richer schemes than taxonomies, 
where we can impose apart from the BT/NT relationship between terms of the same 
hierarchy, the associative or related term (RT) relationship, connecting relative terms 
across hierarchies. RT relationship is frequently used for the assignment of the relation 
between an object and its properties (has relationship); for example the terms poison and 
toxicity. 
There is also the equivalence relationship, where two terms mean exactly the same 
thing under different names or abbreviations (e.g. beast and animal or United Nations 
and UN). The equivalence is denoted by the USE and UF (used for) fields, where USE 
offers to an unauthorized term a link to the corresponding authorized equivalent term 
and UF accompanies an authorized term with all the equivalent unauthorized terms, 
that could be used in place of the current term. Other useful relationships are part_of 
relationship in case of an entity being part of another one (e.g. finger and hand) and 
member_of relationship in case of an entity being member of a set (e.g. a footballer of a 
football group). 
Both BT/NT and equivalence relationships have the form subject – is – predicate. 
They are presented in detail in Sophist, where a lot of conversation was spent in order to 
discern the exact type of relationship between primary concepts like being, one and 
whole. BT/NT relationship is implied under the expressions ‘possessing the attribute of’ or 
‘imposed upon’ or ‘participating’ (Greek terms: πεπονθός, πάθος ἔχειν, μετέχειν), and 
sometimes by the expression ‘being in a way’, (Greek expression: εἶναί πως); instead 
equivalence relationship is given through the expression ‘the same to’ (Greek term 
ταὐτόν).  
The conversation takes place between the stranger from Elea holding new radical 
philosophical opinions (echoing possibly the beliefs of late Plato) and Theaetetus, 
representing the supporters of the traditional Phaedrus-Platonic position. 
The stranger asks Theaetetus “will they say that the whole is other than the one 
which exists or the same with it?”[40]. Here he wonders if ‘one’ and ‘whole’ are related 
through the equivalence relation, as we conclude by the use of the phrase ‘the same 
with’.  
Next the stranger says “nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the 
attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole”[41]. 
Here he supports that “what has parts” is “one” in a BT/NT relationship between one 
(BT) and what has parts (NT); this is implied through the expression ‘possessing the 
attribute of’ (Greek term: πάθος ἔχειν). He ensures next about the type of the 
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relationship, saying that “But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize 
with reason”[42], meaning that ‘what consists of many parts’ is not equivalent with 
‘unity’ (the one). He concludes with a saying, which in my opinion is the earliest clear 
declaration discerning the two ways of predication, BT/NT and equivalence: “for being, 
having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as 
unity”[43]. He affirms BT/NT relationship between unity (the one) (BT) and being (NT) 
through the expressions ‘imposed upon’ (Greek term πεπονθός) and ‘in a way’ (Greek 
term πως). Additionally, he negates equivalence relationship between them through the 
expression ‘not the same as’ (Greek term ταὐτόν). 
It is interesting to conclude the attempts of Plato to define the relationships 
between ‘one’, ‘being’ and ‘whole’, by referring Aristotle, who presents the 
contradictory effects from considering being (Greek word εἶναι) and one (Greek word 
ἕν) as predicates of substance (Greek word ὂν)[44].  
Later, the stranger in Sophist says that the greatest genera are ‘being’ (Greek term 
ὂν), ‘motion’ (Greek word κίνησις) and ‘rest’ (Greek word στάσις)[45]. It is important 
to identify their relations under the words of the stranger. He declares explicitly that 
‘motion’ is descendant of ‘being’, in saying “it is clear, then, that motion really [is not, 
and also that it] is, since it participates to being”[46]. The term ‘participates’ (Greek 
word μετέχει) shows the BT/NT relationship between ‘being’ (BT) and ‘motion’ (NT). I 
suppose that the same holds for ‘rest’, the adversary of ‘motion’, since it similarly 
participates to ‘being’. To make it even more clear the stranger says “According to its 
own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion”[47], where he might mean that 
‘being’ is parent of ‘motion’ and ‘rest’, not a descendant of either, and thus either 
‘motion’ or ‘rest’ cannot be predicated by ‘being’. 
Next, the stranger concludes the introduction of classes, adding the supposed 
class of ‘the same’ (Greek term ταὐτόν) and the supposed class of ‘other’ (Greek term 
ἕτερον). I think that the characterization of ‘the same’ and ‘other’ as classes is somehow 
misleading in the comprehension of the classification scheme. In my opinion, they do 
not denote classes, but rather types of relationship. ‘The same’ denotes equivalence 
relationship, while ‘other’ denotes two disjoint classes. This suggestion might be 
supported by the saying “certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same”[48], 
meaning that ‘motion’ and ‘rest’ refer to classes, while ‘other’ and ‘the same’ refer to 
relationships. Similarly the obscure phrase “Then it [motion] is in a sense not other and 
also other”[49] might mean that ‘motion’ can take part in either an equivalence 
relationship related to itself or a disjoint relationship related with other disjoint terms. 
And in the phrase mentioned before “it is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also 
that it is, since it participates to being”, the first negation ‘motion really is not’ means, as 
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the stranger explains, that ‘motion’ participates to the nature of ‘other’; to use the 
relationship terminology, it means that ‘motion’ takes part in relationships with disjoint 
terms. 
Lastly, the stranger gives an excellent description of the object of the science of 
dialectics, with the remark that “some of the classes will mingle with one another, and 
others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that there is 
nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all”[50], meaning that the 
amplitude of predication process (mingling) of concepts depends on their position in 
the taxonomy. 
3. Web as an extended-Platonic model  
The relationships examined in the previous chapter are the foundations of 
thesauri systems, which are used widely for effective literal and semantic search and 
retrieval in the context of texts of a natural language or more usually in the case of a 
sub-language.  
The simple ontological taxonomy is the primitive Sophist-Platonic model of 
classes interrelated by the BT/NT relationship. The universe of discourse, namely the 
field of application of this model covers the whole natural environment. Each object of 
the universe can be connected to a relative concept of the taxonomy, under an 
instance_of relationship; all the individuals are connected to the concept of human 
being, all the dogs to the concept of dog etc. Could a taxonomy be used for 
identification purposes? The degree of identification would depend on the classification 
detail. If the taxonomy ended with the class ‘dog’, we would not be able to identify a 
certain dog as belonging to a specific race.    
Let focus now on the world wide web (www), the universe of interconnected 
web hypertext pages containing rich text, multimedia data and connections to other 
pages. Web page management information system includes: (1) index tables 
automatically derived by software (robot or crawler programs), where the 
representative indices are keywords extracted from the title, the description, the text or 
the content declaration fields of the web pages and (2) hierarchies (directories) of 
thematic categories, where the representative categories have been defined by human 
beings, based on various semantic views of the content. Therefore, directories are fewer 
but superior to index tables in terms of content quality. 
I consider web as the universe of discourse instead of the natural environment, 
web pages as the objects of the material world accessed in screen or printed form by our 
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senses, and keywords, extracted from or related to the pages, as the entities of the non-
material Platonic world. This model could be viewed as an extended Platonic model. I 
keep the term ‘Platonic’ to remind that the representative keywords (indices or thematic 
categories) of the web pages constitute a level different from the level of pages 
(metadata distinguished from data). Additionally, I put the term ‘extended’ to remark 
that this model has a more complicate structure in comparison to the primitive Sophist-
Platonic model.  
At first I want to refer to the issue of priority. Plato, as I mentioned before, 
supported that ideas are prior to the objects and they exist absolutely, independently of 
the objects that depend and participate to them. Aristotle tried to increase the 
importance of the sensible objects, saying that each object includes both form (pattern 
idea) and matter. Later, Alexander Afrodisiensis, the most important annotator of 
Aristotle, supported that the genera (Greek word καθόλου) are human noetic 
constructions extracted from the common properties of certain groups of individuals 
(Greek word καθέκαστα). He contended that the individuals are prior to the genera, 
which are not self-existent entities, but concepts derived and existing only in human 
mind. Similarly, in web, keywords (indices or thematic categories) are obviously 
posterior to the texts, since they are either extracted from the text (indices) or they are 
made according to the text (categories).  
A critical feature of the web model is the multiplicity of connections between an 
object of the web page world to the keywords of the Platonic world. Instead of the 
unary relation between a material object and the corresponding idea in the Sophist-
Platonic model, a web page is related to a set of literal keywords stored in the index 
tables, as well as to a set of thematic categories. Additionally, the hierarchies of 
categories consist of concepts organized through BT/NT, equivalence and RT 
relationships, while primitive Sophist-Platonic model was restricted to BT/NT 
relationship. Lastly, web management search services use extensively the USE and UF 
correspondence tools. 
The more the connections between web pages (material objects) and keywords 
(non-material concepts), the more the recall of the retrieved pages. The richer the 
semantic hierarchies of categories, the more the precision of the retrieved pages.  
Such a structure explains also the superiority of fuzzy matching to exact 
matching. In the latter we do locate an object through a fixed correspondence to a 
certain characteristic; in the former we try to locate it based on a multitude of 
components with various weights. 
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Conclusion 
This work was an attempt at exploiting the Platonic model as a tool to face the 
fundamental issue of the nature of digital information, as well as localization and 
classification issues. As far as classification is concerned I tried to present a review of 
the traditional Sophist-Platonic model through the words of early and late Plato in 
terms of contemporary relationship schemes. A thorough examination of the 
predicative propositions included in Sophist results to an informational view of the 
ontological theory of late Plato. Lastly, I tried to interpret the structure of web 
management system as an extended Platonic model. I hope that this study will be a 
contribution to reveal the diachronic validity of ancient philosophical sayings, when 
viewed under contemporary information contexts. 
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